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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FRIENDSHIP MANOR CORPORATION,
a Utah Non-Profit and Charitable Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

THE TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH; EARL M. BAKER, Salt Lake
County Assessor; SID LAMBOURNE,
Salt Lake County Treasurer; and ROYAL
K. HUNT, OSCAR HANSON, JR., and
PHILLIP BLOMQUIST, Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah; GLEN PALMER,
Salt Lake City Auditor,

Case No.
12145

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff-respondent contends in its Argument I,
that the evidence as introduced in this case supports
the Trial Court's finding that plaintiff's property (at
least to the extent it is not occupied by persons under 62 or not handicapped) is used exclusively for
charitable purposes and thus exempt from the ad
valorem tax.
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The Trial Court in its Judgment and Decree,
paragraph 3 thereof, held that the defendant-appellants, which include the Tax Commission of the
State of Utah and Earl M. Baker, Salt Lake County
Assessor, are to assess only those apartments that
are occupied solely by persons who are under 62
years of age, not handicapped, and not employed
by plaintiff to assist in the management or operation of Friendship Manor, as of January 1, of each
tax year (Tr. 304, 305).
Nothing is set forth in the Judgment and Decree
pertaining to the financial condition of the occupant of Friendship Manor, but the Court takes the
position that any apartment occupied by an individual on January 1 of the taxable year, regardless
of his financial condition (all could be millionaires,
for that matter), is not to be assessed, but is determined to be used exclusively for charitable purposes, by the interpretation of the Judgment and
Decree, by the mere fact that the occupant thereof
is 62 years of age, or over. The interpretation of the
Judgment and Decree also is to the effect that if the
occupant of one of the apartments in Friendship
Manor is under the age of 62 years on January 1
of the taxable year, although he may be in dire financial distress, nevertheless his apartment would
have to be assessed, even though he may be 61
years and 11 months old.
We contend, contrary to the statement of plaintiff-respondent, that there is no evidence in the case
to support the proposition that the fact that an apart-

r
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ment occupied by a person of 62 years of age or
older is therefore used exclusively for charitable
purposes and thus exempt from the ad valorem tax.
There is nothing in Article XIII, Section 2 of the
Constitution of Utah, nor Section 59-2-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, to support the proposition that a
person occupying an apartment in Friendship
Manor automatically, by virtue of his attaining the
age of 62, makes the apartment non-assessable, and
therefore that it is being used exclusively for
charitable purposes because of the attainment by
the occupant of the age of 62.
The Legislature of the state of Utah has at no
time declared by legislative enactment the public
policy of this state to be that anyone attaining the
age of 62 is automatically the subject of charity; that
is, that any organization furnishing services and
apartments such as is the case in Friendship Manor,
constitutes the use of property exclusively for
charitable purposes. No evidence was introduced
into this case to support the Judgment and Decree
of the Trial Court in holding that the age of 62
should be an age to be used to determine whether
the occupying of an apartment constitutes exclusive
charitable use. As far as the evidence and records
are concerned, the Court could have used the age
of 58 or 65, for that matter.
We feel the Trial Court by artibtrarily taking
the age of 62 was judicially legislating.
It will not be our purpose to rehash and burden
the Court with the arguments advanced in the brief
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of defendants-appellants heretofore filed, but only
m call the Court's attention to certain cases cited
and quoted portions thereof, and statements made
by plainiff-respondent in support of its contention
in support of the Trial Court's decree that those
apartments used by individuals of the age of 62
years or over, and not handicapped, are exclusively
for charitable purposes; we believe the statements
are unfounded and the cases quoted and cited are
not applicable to the questions before this Honorable Court.
We agree with the statement of plaintiff-respondent that the question of whether providing
housing for the elderly constitutes a charitable purpose does not appear to have been considered by
this Court. When speaking of elderly, we must always remember that from the Court's decree in this
case, that means 62 years of age or over. The issue
here is whether or not the property in question was
used exclusively for charitable purposes.
Plaintiff-respondent cites the Utah case of
Salt Lake Lodge No. 85, BPOE v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah l, 120
Pac. 192 (1911), in support of their contention that
the charitable exemption of the Constitution and
Statute should receive a broad and liberal construction. This case states as follows, as a reason for this
liberal construction:
"The reason for the rule is that the state,
by exempting property used exclusively for one
or more of the purposes mentioned from taxation, is presumed to receive benefits from

I

I
I
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the property equivalent at least to the public
revenue that would otherwise be derived from
it."

There is an absolute absence of any evidence
in this case to support any contention that the
Friendship Manor is so used that the state would
receive benefits from the property equivalent to at
least to the public revenue that would otherwise be
derived from it.
Taxes in this case, if levied, assessed and collected, would amount to approximately $48,000 to
$50,000 per year.

It must be remembered that in this case the

tenants must be ambulatory, self-sustaining, and
pay for every service performed and received by
them; the property being self-sustaining in every
respect. If taxes were assessed, they would have to
be added to the rent.

It is fundamental that in analyzing the facts in
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support of an exemption for charitable purposes,
that it be first determined whether the occupants
of the propery claimed to be exempt were the principal beneficiaries rather than society in general,
and that society was not relieved of responsibility
of persons in need.
In this case the occupants of the apartments are
the beneficiaries of the exemption, that is, because
there is no tax to be assessed, the rent is at a lower
figure than if taxes were assessed. In other words,
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the occupant is the sole beneficiary of the tax exemption.
As the evidence as introduced shows (Tr. 496,
497), rent was computed upon bringing a return
that would pay for every expense whatever, including amortization of mortgage and payment of
interest; and in the event that taxes were to be assessed, the rent would have to be increased and the
occupants pay the increased rent that would equal
the proportionate amount of taxes levied.
We would like to again refer this Honorable
Court to the case of Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerville Independent School District, 426 SW2d 943, in which the
Supreme Court of Texas made the comment that
decisions denying exemption have emphasized that
the occupants of the homes were the principal beneficiaries rather than society in general, and that society was not relieved of responsibility for persons
in need. It enunciated the rule that all of the courts
appear to pay homage to the rule that tax exemptions are subject to strict construction since they are
the antithesis of equality and uniformity.
The Texas Court stated that the problem before it was whether Hilltop Village was an institution of purely public charity in its assumed task
of providing a home for the aged in the manner it
had chosen to so do.
The Court made the following statement:
"The theory upon which institutions of
this character are exempted from taxation is
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that they serve the government by relieving it
to some extent of what would otherwise be a
public duty or governmental function to care
for the indigent, sick and afflicted, and it is
the assumption by such institutions of this
burden which compensates the government for
the exemption granted them from the general
obligation resting upon all citizens to pay
taxes. * * *"

We would like to call the Court's attention to
the Articles of Incorporation which provide that no
part of the income or assets of the corporation shall
be distributed to, nor inure to the benefit of, any
individual, except such benefits as may inure to all
tenants through reduction of monthly charges. Reduction
of monthly charges is accomplished by Friendship
Manor not paying taxes.
The occupants of Friendship Manor could get
the same services rendered at Friendship Manor at
other private apartments, but if they did so they
would have to pay a higher monthly charge in view
of the fact that the private enterprise furnishing the
apartment would have to pay taxes. For illustration,
he Newhouse Hotel. In Appellants' Brief we set
forth the types of services and the fact situation with
regard to the Newhouse Hotel.
The plaintiff cites the case of Fredericka Home for
the Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal.2d 789, 221 P.2d 68
0950). We would like to give the Court the benefit
of more of the facts and statements of the Supreme
Court of California in this case than were given by
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the plaintiff. The court made the following significant statement:
"While it is true that each applicant for
admission to the home is required to pay an
entry fee in return for his care, it is also true
that plaintiff (the taxpayer requiring exemption) contributes a substantial proportion of
the annual cash expenditures, as well as the
use of its property for such care. * * * "

The court further commented on the evidence
as follows:
"Certain other schedules introduced in
evidence clearly showed that over 25 per cent
of plaintiff's gross cash income, as well as its
lands and buildings, came from sources other
than the residents of the home. The trial court
found that the total amounts received by
plaintiff from its inmates and from the endowment fund have always been insufficient
to pay operating expenses of the home, and
that the deficit has been met through voluntary gifts and contributions from persons not
inmates of the home. * * *"

In this case the land and buildings were donated by the sponsors and subsequent buildings
were further donated to the sponsors ,or the corporation, as that term may be applied. Applicants
for admission must have attained the age of 69
years.
We feel that the Supreme Court of California
made a significant statement which we have quoted

I
r
I

I

i

9
above, and we direct the Court to that portion in
which it stated ':· ':that the deficit has been met
through voluntary gifts and contributions from persons not inmates of the home. In this case the inmates
of the home did not pay the full cost of their support
and maintenance as herein explained. The rates
to be charged the inmates in this case were set so
that the amounts received from the inmates, together with the income from endowment and other
sources, would equal expenses. We further quote
from the decision on page 72 where the Supreme
Court of California makes a very significant statement:
" ':' * ':' Accordingly, it is our conclusion that

where, as here, the payments made by the
elderly residents are within the reach of persons of limited means, where such payments
are not commnsurate with the benefits derived,
where there is no element of private gafn, and
where all the income of the institution-include that received from residents and the substantial portion received from gifts and other
sources-is devoted exclusively to affording a
reasonable standard of care to such elderly persons for the balance of their lives, the concept
of charity in its ordinary sense, as well as under
a strict but reasonable construction of the welfare exemption law, is met". (Emphasis ours)

In the Friendship Manor case before us, the
tenants make payments commensurate with the
benefits derived.
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We ask the question, how can it be said that
charity is dispensed when a person pays value in
money for all benefits bestowed?
This case is not in point and the factual situation is entirely different.
Plaintiff cites the case of Bozeman Deaconess Foundation v. Ford et al, 439 P.2d 915 (Mont. 1968).
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution of Montana is as follows:
"The property of the United States, the
state, counties, cities, towns, school districts,
municipal corporations and public libraries shall
be exempt from taxation; and such other property as may be used exclusively for the agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places actual religious worship,
hospitals, and places of burial not used or held
for private or corporate profit, institutions of
purely public charity and evidences of debt sesecured by mortgages of record upon real or
personal property in the State of Montana,
may b exempt from taxation." (Emphasis ours)

Section 84-202, RCM 1947, which is the Montana
statute before the court in this case, provided that
the term "institutions of purely public charity" as
used in the act shall include organizations owning
and operating facilities for the care of the retired
or aged or chronically ill which are not operated
for gain or profit.
Because of the Constitution, and because of
the statute implementing the same, we do not have

I

I

_.....
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the same situation before this Court as was before
Montana court. There the Legislature had seen fit
under its Constitution to define "purely public
charity''.
The facts in this (the Montana) case show that
of the $2,000,000 cost of the complex housing the
aged, $1,820,000 was borrowed and was insured
under authority of the National Housing Act; the
balance of $180,000 coming from the Foundation or
the owner of the complex housing the aged. The
Foundation was oriented to the Methodist Church,
having what may be termed the Church as a sponsor.
The 1v1ontana Supreme Court made the following significant statement:

" * * * Here the record shows that plaintiff is ministering to its elderly residents at
a charge which, although appreciable, is within the reach of persons in modest circumstances and is no greater than that which is
required to augment the substantial amount
which plaintiff is able to contribute to the accomplisment of its purpose." (Emphasis ours)
It will be noted that in the foregoing case there
are several distinctions between the facts and the
law than the case before this Honorable Court;
namely, the Foundation or the sponsor owning the
housing complex made a very substantial contribution in the cost of construction; that apparently the
rental required by those occupying the units was
not sufficient to pay the costs of maintenance,
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amortization, etc.; further, that substantial donation
was made to make up the difference. Further, the
definition of "charity" as outlined by the Montana
Supreme Court would have to be in the light of
their Statute and their Constitution, which we have
set forth. This would have no application to the law
and the facts in the case before this Honorable
Court.
The plaintiff cites the case of Topeka Presbyterian

Manor, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Shawnee
County et al, 195 Kan. 90, 402 P.2d 802 (1965). The facts

in this case are that the complex involved was built
and equipped with approximately $400,000 in gifts
and a Federal Housing Administration secured commercial loan in the sum of approximately $1,000,000.
The Manor, which is the complex involved, made
an effort to secure an entrance fee of $2,000 but
of the eighty-two persons in residence on January
31, 1964, eleven persons had paid no membership
fee, three had paid only the welfare rate, and two
others paid less than the desired minimum monthly charge. The facts further are that the Manor's income
from residents would not alone cover operating costs and the
required monthly mortgage payment and it would have to
continue to receive gifts in order to operate. That the average
monthly deficit in December, 1963, was the sum of $76.17
per person.

The Kansas court made this further significant
statement:
"The manner of operation of the Fredericka
Home (referring to Fredericka Home for the
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Aged v. San Diego County, supra) was substantially similar to the operation of Manor
except Fredericka used a 'life care contract'
basis for admission, with a more substantial
entrance fee. The fees were inadequate to maintain operation of the home without gifts or
donations. The court held that in spite of the
substantial entrance fee, where the payments
were within reach of persons of limited means
and were not commensurate with the costs of
the benefits they received, and there was no
element of private gain with all of the organization's income devoted exclusively to affording a reasonable standard of care to such persons, the home's property was used exclusively
for charitable purposes." (Emphasis ours)

In the Montana case, as well as the Fredericka
case, substantial donations each year were made
by gifts and donations so that the recipients or the
tenants did not pay a rental fee commensurate with
the costs of the benefits they received.
We, therefore, feel that this case is easily distinguishable and has no application to the matter
before this Court.
The plaintiff-respondent has referred to the case
of Tax Appeals of the United Presbyterian Homes of the
Presbytery of Huntingdon, 236 A.2d 776 (Penn. 1968.)
In reviewing the various cases pertaining to
dispensing of charity, as well as charitable institutions or property being used for charitable purposes, it must be kept in mind that the comments
made by the various courts with respect to charity
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and what constitutes the same is reflected and is interpreted by virtue of the various constitutional provisions and legislation in implementing the same.
The constitutional provisions and the statutes implementing the same vary among the various states.
In the Pennsylvania case the Constitution of the
State of Pennsylvania exempted institutions of purely public charity. The statute of the State of Pennsylvania in implementing this constitutional provision is the act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 571, as amended,
72 P.S. § 5453.-202 (3). In referring to institutions of
a private charity nature, it provided that the entire
revenue derived by the same be applied to the
support and to increase the efficiency and facilities
thereof, the repair and the necessary increase of
grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other
purpose. The statute further provided that the property of these institutions shall not be used in such
a manner as to compete with commercial enterprises.
Any comments by the court as quoted with regard to the application of the definition of what
constitutes charity must be read in the light of the
foregoing.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made the
significant statement, page 779 of the opinion, that
the public or general welfare policy of Pennsylvania has been increasingly broadened to include
greater and greater concern and care for the aged
and the sick and the infirm, and consequently the
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words "charity" and "public charity" must be given
a liberal interpretation.
In Utah it must be pointed out that the Legislature at this time has not yet seen fit to take any
action of defining a general welfare policy that
would assist the Court in adopting a liberal definition of what constitutes exclusive use for charitable
purposes in interpreting the Constitution of the
State of Utah and the statute implementing the
same.
The plaintiff refers to the case of Milwaukee
Protestant Home for the A g e d v. City of Milwaukee,
164 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. 1969).

InWisconsin the Legislature has acted, and the
question of public policy involved has been defined.
In 1967 the Wisconsin Legislature amended
their statute to specifically include benevolent
nursing homes and retirement homes for the aged
in the tax exempt statute. The Wisconsin act previously had exempted from taxation property of a
benevolent association, and used exclusively for
benevolent purposes and not for profit.
It held that under the Wisconsin statute as written, it is the basic nature of the institution and the
dominant purpose of the operation which controls.

The plaintiff-respondent has cited excerpts
from the case of Electra Arms Apartment and Medical
Center Foundation, Inc., a Corporation of the State of Dela-
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ware, v. The City of Wilmington, a municipal Corporation
of the State of Delaware, 254 A2d 244. We feel that in

order to properly evaluate these excerpts as quoted
we should give to the Court the benefit of more information regarding the same.
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the
questions of law presented are as follows:
" ( 1) Should a corporation irrevocably
dedicated to a non-profit charitable purpose
and sponsored by a civic group maintaining a
rental dwelling specifically designed for rental
to the aged and handicapped, which is being
rented primarily to that group, and which is
running at a substantial loss, which loss is
being absorbed by the sponsoring body, be
granted exemption from property taxes as a
corporation created for charitable purposes
not held by way of investment pursuant to
9 Del.C. § 8103?"

The statute of Delaware pertaining to the questions presented to the Court is as follows:
"T. 9 Del. C. § 8103 reads as follows:
'Property belonging to this State, or the
United States, or any county of this State, or
owned by any municipality of this State and
held for public use, or any church or religious
society, and not held by way of investment,
or any college or school and used for educational or school puropses, or any not held by
way of investment, except as otherwise provided, shall not be liable to taxation and as-
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sessment for public purposes by any county
or other political subdivision of this State.' "
(Emphasis ours)

It will be noted from the foregoing that the
statute interpreted is entirely different from the Utah
Constitution and the Utah statute.
The application of the exemption being to property of any corporation created for charitable purposes and not held by way of investment. Under
the Utah Constitution and statute the exemption
only applies to property used exclusively for charitable purposes. In Utah a corporation may be a
charitable one, but still the property not being used
exclusively for charitable purposes. The test in Utah
is whether or not the property is used exclusively
for charitable purposes.
Plaintiff-respondent cites the Arizona case of
Meniorial Hospital vs. Sparks, 453 P.2d 989. In this case
the Memorial Hospital erected two 10-story buildings containing 153 housekeeping units or apartments. The Memorial Hospital provided the administration for the Towers for the 153 housekeeping
units or apartments. The tenants of the apartments
had the use of the hospital cafeteria and food trays
from the dietary kitchen of the hospital are sent over
to the residents of the Towers when they are ill. The
administrator of the hospital testified that they only
accept occupants in these apartments who have an
income of $3,DOO annual income or less. That none
of the 123 tenants had an annual income over
$3,300. That the hospital has subsidized some of the

18

rent, and this subsidization was done by carrying
tenants who have not been able to pay their rent.
We call the attention of the Court to the Arizona
Constitution, which provides as follows:
"Section 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS. There
shall be exempt from taxation all federal,
state, county and municipal property. Property
of educational, charitable and religious associations or institutions not used or held for profit
may be exempt from taxation by law. * * * All
property in the state not exempt under the
laws of the United States or under this constitution, or exempt by law under the provisions
of this section shall be subject to taxation to
be ascertained as provided by law. This section
shall be self-executing." (Emphasis added)

The Arizona Revised Statutes provide:
"All property in the state shall be subject
to taxation, except:

****
"4. Hospitals, asylums, poor houses and
other charitable institutions for relief of the
indigent or afflicated, and the lands appurtenant thereto, with their fixtures and equipment, not used or held for profit." § 42-271
A.R.S. (Emphasis ours)

It will be readily seen from the above quoted
provisions of the Arizona law that the Constitution
and the Statute implementing the same are not comparable to those of Utah, the Constitution providing
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that property of charitable institutions not used or
held for a profit may be exempt from taxation, the
Statute implementing the constitutional provision
providing that charitable institutions for relief of the
indigent or afflicted and the lands appurtenant
thereto, not used or held for profit are exempt from
taxation. The Arizona Supreme Court determined
that under the Arizona Constitution and the Arizona
Revised Statutes that the sum total of the uses to
which the property was used indicated that it is a
charitable institution within the meaning of the
Constitution and the laws of Arizona.
The Arizona Supreme Court made a very significant statement which we would like to quote:
" * * * An institution will be c 1 as s e d as
charitable if the dominant purpose of its work
is for the public good and the work done for
its members is but the means adopted for this
purpose. But if the dominant purpose of its
work is to benefit its members or a limited
class of persons it will not be so classed, even
though the public will derive an incidental
benefit from such work."

Plaintiff-respondent in its brief has chosen to
quote excerpts from the cases cited and referred
to in its brief without giving the fact situation or the
constitutions and the statutes implementing the
same, of the various states, on which the court of
last resort has made interpretations thereof. The excerpts quoted by plaintiff-respondent without reference to the constitution and the fact situation in
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each case become meaningless. Each case q_uoted
by plaintiff-respondent must be interpreted in the
light of the constitution and the statute implementing the same, together with the fact situation. Just
to take excerpts leads to a misleading interpretation.
We have, therefore, attempted to analyze each of
the cases quoted by plaintiff-respondent in the light
of the constitution and the factual situation. This is
the only way the Court can properly interpret and
apply the excerpts or the cases quoted by plaintiff.
respondent to the instant case.
We are taking the liberty of citing to this Honorable Court a recent case from the state of
Nebraska decided on October 9, 1970, which was
after our brief was filed in this matter, which we
thing would be of help to the Court. This case is

Christian Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Board of Equalization
of the County of Lancaster, Nebraska, and the County of
Lancaster, State of Nebraslza, 180 NW2d 136. Article VIIt

1

Section 2 of the Constitution of the state of Nebraska j
provides that property which is owned and used !'
exclusively for religious or charitable purposes and
is not owned or used for financial gain or profit is I
exempt from taxation.
/
The fact situation in this case is as follows:

"*** that the primary or dominant use

of the property, other than the chapel and
medi-center, is to provide housing for elderly
persons. The average age of the residents of the
home is about 74 years. At the time of admission they must be physically able to maintain

r
(

i

r
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themselves in their own apartment. They are
required to sign an occupancy agreement, pay
an entrance endowment, and pay a monthly
food and service charge. Applicants are required to furnish a financial statement and
show that they will be able to pay the monthly fees. The occupancy agreement provides that
an occupant's residency shall not be terminated
solely by reason of the inability of an occupant to pay the monthly fees, if such a dispensation can be granted without impairing the
ability of the home to operate on a sound
financial basis.
"The entrance endowment is a lump sum
payment of from $7,950 to $15,950 and is in the
nature of a life-lease payment. Clergymen and
missionaries are allowed a 25 percent discount.
It is estimated that the entrance endowments
will retire the debts against the home in a
period of 8 to 10 years and may be discontinued at that time.
"The monthly food and service charge is
intended to cover the actual operating costs of
the home. The residents are required to eat
one meal a day in the dining room, but are entitled to eat all of their meals there if they
desire. Food service in the apartments is available when necessary, and emergency nursing
service is available at all times.
"The occupancy agreement provides that
the occupant shall have the right to live in the
home for the rest of his life and receive unlimited infirmary care in the home. Although
the residents of the home residing in the apartments have the benefit of nursing and hospital
services when needed, the record shows that
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most of these residents require such services
only occasionally. In this respect the home
is best described as a retirement home rather
than a nursing home furnishing daily care
similar to hospital care to the occupants."

We further quote from the decision of the case
as follows:
"We are committed to the rule that property which is owned and used primarily for
the purpose of furnishing low-rent housing is
not entitled to exemption from taxation as
property which is owned and used exclusively
for charitable purposes. County of Douglas v.
OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111
N.W.2d 719.
"The services furnished to the residents
of Eastmont Manor are somewhat different in
quantity and quality from those described in
the OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., case, but the
fact remains that the primary use of the property is to provide housing for elderly persons.
The plan is to operate the home at cost, with
the residents providing the funds necessary
to operate the home and retire its debt. Although the operation of the home includes
many worthy charitable aspects, the ownership
and use of the property, at this time, is not
exclusively charitable."

We would like to further refer the Court to the
case of County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc.,
111 N.W.2d 719, which was cited in the case of
Christian Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of
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supra, in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska found that nonprofit corporations property used primarily for low-rent housing for senior citizens was not owned and used
exclusively for "charitable purposes," where it was
intended that each occupant should be charged his
part of cost of operation, maintenance and amortization of mortgage and property was taxable, notwithstanding any determination of federal internal
revenue service that contributions to the corporation were deductible as charitable donations. Const.
art. 8, § 2; R.R.S. 1943, §§ 21-1501 to 21-1508,
the County of Lancaster, et al,

77-202.

It must be remembered that all of the activities
of Friendship Manor are activities and services
readily within the ability of any organizaton or indviduals to perform. They are now being performed
by individuals and organizations such as the Newhouse Hotel, which we have referred to in our brief
and given the factual situation with regard to the
same.

The basic deficiency in the Trial Court's findings and reasoning is that it grants a a charitable
exemption to occupants of a nonprofit organization's
housing, which is paid for by these persons who
benefit from the same. In other words, under the
Trial Court's reasoning, if a person is 62 he is entitled to tax-free housing regardless of the fact that
he may be a millionaire. If he is 61 he is not entitled to tax-free housing even though he may be in
dire financial condition. When we say tax-free hous-
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ing, we mean, of course, the Friendship Manor
would either have to absorb the tax assessment on
the apartment occupied by a person 61 years or
younger or else it would have to be added to his
rent.
As estified by Mrs. Zwick (Tr. 496, 497), in the
event taxes were assessed the rent would have to
be increased and the occupants pay the increased
rent that would equal the proportionate amount of
taxes levied.
Can it not be said that the Friendship Manor
could add to its present operation a large and luxurious swimming pool, sauna baths, miniature golf
courses and various other recreational activities,
and, of course, which would be exempt from taxation; extra charge to be made for these activities,
which would make them self-sustaining.
Swimming pools or golf courses can be for
charitable purposes under the reasoning of the
Court. Such facilities benefit the community by promoting health and teaching psysical education, and
are for the well-being and increasing of the life expectancy of the occupants of this type of housing.
Under the reasoning of plaintiff-respondent
there would be nothing to prohibit a housing complex or a high-rise housing project of elaborate and
ostentatious construction, and which adjoining
thereto would be a swimming pool, recreational
facilities, including a golf course, large or small,
and if all occupants are limited to the age of 62 or

1
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over, the complex would be tax-free; notwithstanding the fact that all of the occupants were millionaires, and only millionaires could afford this type
of elaborate housing. According to the reasoning
of plaintiff-respondent, as long as the occupant is
62 and the organization managing and sponsoring
the same is nonprofit, the same would be tax
exempt.
We do not believe it can be said that the furnishing of housing to adults of 62 years of age or
over is in itself a charitable purpose, particularly
when we realize that the rents in this case are fixed
at an amount necessary to pay the interest, amortize
the principal, and pay all expenses of maintaining
the operation. In other words, the tenants are required to pay for the premises occupied by them,
with the rents being fixed so as to return the
0.mount estimated as necessary to pay out the project. It must be remembered that Friendship Manor
is competitive with private industry or landlords offering apartments for rent and rendering the same
services as those of Friendship Manor, and yet must
pay taxes. There is no evidence that the public is
relieved of any expenses in comparison with the
loss of tax revenue.
It can be said that care for the aged is a proper
concern of the government, but it cannot be said
that governmental obligation extends to the care
of physically and financially independent persons
of the age of 62 years or older. It seems to us there
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must be present benefit to the general public which
is sufficient to justify the loss of tax revenue.
We respectful! y urge this Honorable Court to
reverse the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court.
ARGUMENT
II.
The defendants-appellants will now direct their
argument to the contention of the plaintiff-respondents in its Argument No. II, that the Trial Court
erred in holding that part of plaintiff's property was
subject to taxation for the years 1968 and 1969. By
this contention of the plaintiff-respondent it is questioning the right of the Tax Commission in directing
the County Assessor, County Auditor and County
Board of Equalization to enter the assessment of
Friendship Manor, together with the real property
on which it is located, on the assessment rolls of
Salt Lake County.
It is the position of defendants-appellants that
the Tax Commission has the power and is required
in the exercise of its duties to proceed to direct the
County Assessor, County Auditor and County Board
of Equalization to enter the assessment of Friendship Manor, together with the real property on
which it is located, on the assessment rolls of Salt
Lake County.
In view of this contention we call the Court's
attention to the powers and authority granted to
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the Commission, as well as its duties as required
by the laws of the state of Utah.
Section 59-5-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, sets forth the general powers and duties
oi the State Tax Commission of the State of Utah.
The pertinent subsections of this section which we
feel are material to the Argument, No. II, of plaintiffrespondent are as follows:
To have and exercise general supervision over the administration of the tax laws
of the state, over assessors and over county
boards in the perfonnance of their duties in
connection with assessment of prop e rt y
and collection of taxes, to the End that all assessments of property be made just and equal,
at true value, and that the tax burden may
be distributed without favor or discrimination." (Emphasis ours)
"(9)

"(19) To examine carefully into all cases
where evasion or violation of the laws for assessment and taxation of property is alleged, complained of or discovered, and to ascertain wherein existing laws are defective or are improperly
or negligently administered." (Emphasis ours)

We must also consider Section 59-7-13, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, which was the
section cited in the directive of the Tax Commission
as its authority to direct that the property in question be put upon the tax rolls:
"59-7-13. Investigation by tax commission - Assessment of escaped property - In-
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crease or decrease of assessed valution - Correction of assessed valution. - Each year the
state .tax com mission shall conduct an investigation throughout each county of the state to
determine whether all property subject to taxalion is on the assessment rolls, * * * when, after
any such investigation, it is found that any property which is subject to taxation is not assessed,
the state tax commission shall direct .the county
assessor, the county board of equalization or the
county auditor as it may determine to enter the
assessmen.t of such escaped property. * * *"
(Emphasis ours)

The plaintiff-respondent in its complaint alleged
that the property in question is exempt from taxation, as the property in question was being used exclusively for charitable purposes, and had been so
exempted by the County Assessor of Salt Lake
County, as well as action taken by the County Commission, no doubt acting in its capacity as a Board
of Equalization.
From the foregoing powers and duties of the
Tax Commission as contained in the laws of Utah
aforementioned, it is clear that the State Tax Com·
mission has general supervision over County Assessors and Boards of Equalization in the performance of their duties in connection with the
assessment of property and administering laws
applicable to the assessment of property. This, of
course, includes the administration of the exempt·
ing of property for charitable purposes. There is
no provision of the laws of Utah, nor any cases in
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interpretation of the Utah laws, which limit or prohibit the Tax Commission from taking whatever
action it deems necessary to correct and implement
the improper administration of the laws of Utah;
particularly in the instance as it pertains to the application of the exemption provided by law for that
property used exclusively for charitable purposes.
The State Tax Commission in its investigation
and supervision of the County Assessors as required by law found and determined that the Friendship Manor property, the property in question in
this case, was not on the tax rolls; that it should be
put on the tax rolls and, therefore, issued its directive in question.
The Tax Commission, as contended by the
plaintiff-respondent, is not assessing real property
or improvements thereon. In its directive it was
leaving that prerogative to the Assessor. The plaintiff-respondent had the right and does have the
right, to object to the assessment by the County
Assessors of the property in question and submit
evidence to the Assessor and the Board of Equalization as being used exclusively for charitable
purposes and, therefore, exempt under the laws of
Utah. It could follow the administrative procedure
as outlined in the statutes. It has not been deprived
of its legal remedies and its administrative procedure as outlined in the statutes. It has not been
deprived of its legal remedies and its administrative procedures as provided for by the laws of
Utah. The plaintiff-respondent's contention that once
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property has been exempt, the Assessor, or no one
else, has a right to put it back on the assessment
rolls, of course, is not correct. The mere fact that
property may be exempt for a charitable purpose
one year does not ipso facto decree that it is exempt for all future years. Each year the Assessor
may investigate and determine whether or not the
property is being used exclusively for charitable 1
purposes, as that term is intended and interpreted
by the courts, as well as to determine the intent of I
the statute, and put the property on the tax rolls. I
Property may be used exclusively for charitable
purposes one year and may be changed the next.
When the Assessor puts property on the tax rolls,
those who contend that it is exempt under the laws,
being used exclusively for a charitable purpose,
have their legal remedies either to follow the administrative procedures as outlined by the laws of
Utah or take the action which is now before this
Honorable Court.
1

1

It is our sincere opinion that there is ample
authority, and not only authority but a requirement,
that the Tax Commission, when it deems property
not on the assessment rolls by virtue of improper
administering of the laws of Utah, by error or otherwise, to direct the Assessor and Board of Equalization to put the property on the assessment roll.

In its supervisory capacity of the Assessor and
the Board of Equalization, the Tax Commission
without any question has this right. Otherwise it
would be powerless to effectively supervise the
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County Assessor and Board of Equalization as required by law.
The mere fact that the Tax Commission in its
directive based its authority on Section 59-7-13,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as the basis upon which
it was to be restored to the tax rolls, does not in any
way invalidate that directive on the mere pretense
that in substantiating its directive the Tax Commission is limted to that particular section. The Tax
Commission directed this restoration of the property on the tax rolls not only under Section 59-7-13,
but under its general powers.
At the trial plaintiff-respondent for the first time
raised Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as a contention that the Tax Commission, if it desired to take the action that it did, must comply with
that section by giving notice and following the procedures so outlined. This we strongly resist. A clear
reading of Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated
1953, should convince this Honorable Court that it
is not applicable to the issue before us, but has i:lPplication to the other procedure that the other procedure that the State Tax Commission may invoke
for the purposes as stated in said section. We quote
for the convenience of the Court the pertinent portion of the statute that is applicable to this brief:

" * * *

In the event the commission shall
intend to make an assessment or reassessment
under this section, notice thereof and of the time
and place fived by it for the determination of
such assessment shall be given by the commis-
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sion, by letter deposited in the post office at
least fifteen days before the date so fixed, to the
owner of such property and to the auditor of
the county in which such property is situated.
Upon the date so fixed the state tax commission shall assess or reassess such property and
shall notify the county auditor of the assessment made, and every such assessment shall
have the same force and effect as if made by
the county assessor before the delivery of the
assessment book to the county treasurer. The
county auditor shall record said assessment
upon the assessment books in the same manner
as is provided in section 59-7-9 in the case of
a correction made by the county board of
equalization, and no county board of equalization or assessor shall have any power to change
any assessment so fixed by the state tax commission. All hearings had upon assessments
made or ordered by the state tax commission
pursuant to this section shall be held in the
county in which the property involved is situated. One or more members of the tax commission may conduct such hearing, and any
assessment made after a hearing before any
number of the members of the tax commission
shall be as valid as if made after a hearing
before the full commission." (Emphasis ours)

It will be noted that the State Tax Commission

did not see fit to follow this section as it was not
applicable to the matters pertaining to the Friend· ;
ship Manor. It elected to proceed under Section
59-7-13 and its general powers. Section 59-5-47 ap·
plies where the Tax Commission intends to make
an assessment or reassessment under this particular
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section. This section gives it the right to make an
assessment or reassessment, and when it does,
properly so, the taxpayer has the right of a hearing
to object and follow the procedure outlined in the
section. The Tax Commission is in place of the
County Assessor under this section if it elects to
: make an assessment under this section, and its assessment has the same force and effect as if made
by the County Assessor.
The Tax Commission did not elect to proceed
under this section and did not assess or reassess
the property in question as provided for by this
section.
The State Tax Commission proceeded under
its general supervisory powers enumerated in Section 59-5-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and particularly Subsections (9) and (19) thereof, together
with Section 59-7-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It
did not assess the property as contemplated under
Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and,
therefore, the procedure outline did not apply, and
the Tax Commission was not required to follow it.
It followed the procedure as contemplated and provided in its general powers and the sections under
which it proceeded.
The defendants-appellants herein submit that
under the Tax Commission's general supervisory
Powers it certainly had the right to proceed as it
did, and to say otherwise would render the Tax
Commission powerless in its investigatory and
supervisory powers which are clearly set forth in
the laws of Utah.
1
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We respectfully submit that the Trial Court die
not err, and that he rightly held that the Tax Com
mission had the right and the authority to do thE
acts as herein set forth.
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Louis H. Callister, Sr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the fora
going Appellants' Reply Brief to each of the follow·
ing this ____ J_l ___ day of December, 1970:
Bryce E. Roe
Roe, Fowler, Jerman & Dart
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Justin C. Stewart
425 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
John L. McCoy
Barker, Ryberg & McCoy
325 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
Utah Odd Fellows Housing, Inc.

/ _ ______

LOUIS HfCALLISTER, SR.

